Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 34426 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-18-2008
Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare
Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 34426
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 34426" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs.
1642.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1642
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Supreme Court No. 34426 
----- 
e Couit Co.,? a! ~ ~ p ~ ~ l ~  1 
Enlcrcd nil x:" t r y  ) L----.- . , -- , , j 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRZEF 
Appeal From The District Court Of The 
Fourth Judicial District Of The State Of Idaho, 
In And For The County of Ada 
D. Duff McKee -District Judge 
M. Scott Keim 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Page 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITY 
Page 
U.S. Statutes 
42 U.S.C. 8 666(a)(16) 7 
Idaho Statutes 
Idaho Code, $7-1401 et seq., Family Law License 




O T m R  AUTHORITY 
IDAPA 16.03.03.604 
CASE AUTHORITY 
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 
133 Idaho 82, 90,982 P.2d 914,926 (1999). 
Adams v. City of Pocatello, 
91 Idaho 99,416 P.2d 46 (I 966). 
JR. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tmc commission, 
120 Idaho 849,820 P.2d 1206 (1991). 
Maron v. Donnelly Club, 
135 Idaho 581,21 P.3d 903 (2001). 
Spencer v. Kootenai County, 
Supreme Court of Idaho, Docket No. 33060, March 6,2008. 
Reafy Argument 
This appeal arises from the legislation that allows Administrative Decisions affecting 
enforcement of court orders upon a request from the Department of Health and Welfare, seeking 
to suspend an individual's driver's license as a sanction for violating a court order of support, 
pursuant to the perceived authority contained within FLLSA, a legislative enactment with little 
or no enforcement criteria as to the basis, duration or particular class of license holding a 
property interest, compounded by the use of an Agency's definition of "good cause", later 
identified in the IDAPA Rules, 16.03.03.604, which appears to provide the only "relevant" 
analysis allowed by the Department to evaluate upon what basis a court order for support is not 
subject to be performed. The district court, upon this Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review, 
elected to affirm the license suspension sought by the Agency and endorsed the administrative 
process that authorizes suspension of the license under FLLSA, and this appeal has raised a 
series of aspects affecting that legislation, including the validity, constitutionality, application 
and enforceability of that FLLSA enactment, and its administrative use as a replacement for 
judicial enforcement of court orders. 
There is no dispute over the fact the court order for support exists, and no dispute over 
the fact Appellant's support obligation was partially unpaid, and that arrears had accrued under 
each of those court orders, both before and after the enactment of this challenged legislation. Our 
Opening Brief has identified Appellant's challenge and the issues raised regarding the FLLSA, 
and this ongoing disagreement over the enforcement of this administrative decision, continues in 
the assessment of these issues raised by this appeal. 
The Department would urge this Court to find our appeal is without any merit, yet goes to 
great length to recognize the concerns raised by Appellant, as they seek to find support for their 
arguments. They begin with wanting this Court to give "considerable weight" to the 
Department's limited definition of "good cause", apparently wanting this Court to equate the 
"considerable weight" concept to be interpreted to mean their exclusive definition is a valid 
exercise of providing substantive due process of law, when it comes to defining the allowed 
reasons for exempting enforcement of FLLSA over an existing state of non-payment of support, 
and has proposed this Court consider as the authority for doing so the cases of Maron v. 
Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 21 P.3d 903 (2001) and JR. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax 
Commission, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991). The Department suggests such limitations 
and adoption of the exclusive reasons for exemption are "reasonably related to the legislation it 
was being promulgated to carry out". We respectfully disagree, as such restrictive allowance of 
such limited relevant and admissible reasons of non-payment do not cover any of the logical and 
realistic economic factors that exist in the real world, such as lay offs, limited skills, limited 
employment opportunities, financial downturns, economic disasters, and temporary illnesses or 
disabilities that cause the deficiencies in all facets of obligations to occur, and perpetuate the 
delinquencies in all forms of obligations to accrue. 
Economic factors are critical, and to disregard their righthl application in the legislative 
scheme is only further aggravated by the imposition of an administrative order that takes away 
your license to drive, the only sensible means by which the average person is able to obtain and 
maintain any gainful employment to generate an income stream to pay his support and other 
financial obligations. To take the license to drive a motor vehicle serves only to take away the 
ability to get and to keep the job, and without the job you take away employment opportunity 
and increase the deficiency and accomplish only a worse situation than before the intervention of 
the Department The courts, if allowed to address these enforcement issues, would not take the 
license of an individual, but rather consider the true reasons for the state of the delinquency, and 
schedule the obligee to retxn for review hearings to determine his true ability to pay current 
support and accrued arrearages, and use the court's inherent contempt powers to control 
enforcement of its orders, and would not impose a failed concept of limiting "good cause" to 
impossible situations only, but rather relate to and work within the court's ability to marshal 
some level of compliance. To even suggest there is a "rational relationship", let alone a 
"reasonable relation to the legislation being enforced" with the harsh sanction of a license 
suspension denies logic and defies reason, and it becomes a stretch of logic in finding that it 
would not go beyond the objectives to be accomplished by the purpose of the enactment. To 
make the situation become one of an "all or nothing" proposition in the relation between finding 
a way to force payment of child support, and being able to keep a job is not reasonable, as it 
becomes an "all or nothing" proposition on the right to have a license to service the debt, and if 
you can't meet the limited good cause exception, the you are defeated entirely, and that is not an 
exercise of justice, equity, or fundamental fairness under the elements of substantive due process 
of law. 
In the context of legislation dealing with social or economic interests, this Court assumes 
a deferential review. See Abe~deen-Sprin&eId Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82,90,982 P.2d 
914,926 (1999). In this context, substantive due process requires that legislation which deprives 
a person of life, liberty, or property must have a rational basis. Id. That is, the statute must bear a 
reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective. Id. The reason for the deprivation 
must not be so inadequate that it may be characterized as an arbitrary exercise of state police 
powers. Id. See also Spencer v. Kootenai County, Supreme Court of Idaho, Docket No. 33060, 
March 6,2008. 
The reality is that to take a driver's license by an administrative agency serves only to 
make an undesirable situation a far worse situation, as you in essence are telling the person you 
don't care about economic interests, you don't care if he keeps his job, and you don't care if he 
becomes part of the unemployment trend. To add insult to the economic factor, you ignore 
social aspects, and you are then also saying you don't care if he has to violate the law by driving, 
and should he elect to do so to keep his jog, his conduct will give rise to a new crime for which 
he will then be punished, despite his economic efforts to keep a job and pay bills and stay off the 
unemployment rolls of the State. It is not sensible to force an individual to consider the violation 
of another law, when he can't even comply with an existing court order on support. 
Compounding economic disasters is not in the State's best interests. This is hardly seen as an 
equitable way to achieve the objective of providing for the welfare of the people of the State of 
Idaho, and serve its social and economic interests. It must be seen as purely an arbitrary exercise 
of a police power, with no rational relationship to the purpose of the State's objective to serve its 
best fmancial, economic and social interests. 
There is no rationale in asking the court to ignore the elements of the contempt powers of 
the court normally exercised in the enforcement of a court order in the traditional sense of court 
compliance. The elements of intentional indifferent disregard, and the opportunity of exercising 
reasonable logic to accept the reason why the individual finds himself in the current financial 
situation he must address and work his way through, is the preferred course of judicial and 
equitable fairness. 
We urge this Court to appreciate the reality this administrative process is inherently 
flawed, and a judicial review of a court order on support is the only substantive way for court 
order enforcement to be addressed, as courts have inherently viewed the means and purpose of 
enforcement differently than an administrative proceeding where there is a "flat out" finding of 
no good cause exists under the Agency definition, and your driver's license is now suspended 
indefinitely, and that becomes the end of the support issue, and level of enforcement of the order 
from there on. 
Where is the rational relationship to the end objective of hying to get fathers to be more 
responsive to support with their contributions for the welfare and benefit of their children, when 
you allow administrative rulings on the issue of cause that are so short-sighted that it eliminates 
explanations of financial difficulties, and then disregard substantive due process with the 
obligation to protect the property rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
The Department has expressed the idea Mr. Wheeler should have presented "facts" into 
evidence to preserve his right to raise his issues as to good cause on appeal. That argument is 
neither logical nor consistent with the promulgated administrative rules or the purpose 
announced in the notification for the hearing. The individual is "told" in the "Notice of 
Suspension" what qualifies for "good cause", and nowhere does the Department invite or allow 
an individual to produce evidence by going outside the Department's definition of good case, as 
a requirement to preserve a challenge to the wrongfulness of that administrative process. The 
proposed evidence of a licensee, outside the Agency definition, would be irrelevant to the cause, 
and it becomes inadmissible to the purpose of the hearing, and the Department has no basis to 
now argue or suggest Mr. Wheeler had an obligation to produce "irrelevant" and "inadmissible" 
evidence at a hearing, as it only serves to ask Mr. Wheeler to ignore the administrative process 
and disregard the rules that he must abide by, if he wants to challenge the process. It is illogical 
to require Mr. Wheeler to present irrelevant and inadmissible facts, as a basis or condition to 
challenge the substantive due process, reasonableness of the law, its relationship of good cause to 
the purpose of the legislation, the constitutionality of the enactment, and the infringement upon 
his constitutional rights under the structure of this FLLSA enactment and the definitions 
contained in the Agency rules. 
The Department argues FLLSA was designed to include a driver's license as being 
justifiably within the reach of the Department's right to infringe upon its issuance, and take that 
right away &om an individual. We must respectfully disagree that FLLSA has that effect by the 
language used, as a driver's license would appear to be regarded a "property right" or a "property 
interest", and must be exempted by virtue of part (d) of the enactment, which specifically says 
what license is subject to suspension. It must be a license that does not constitute a property 
interest. Was that meant to mean only a water right, or only a mineral interest in real property? 
Why didn't the legislature expressly define what it was meant to be by the use of the phrase 
"property interest"? 
The debate is now over whether that was meant to include what is a driver's license. 
That matter of definition was thought to have been decided in the Adams case rendered in 1966, 
which we rely upon as demonstrating a proposition a driver's license constitutes a property right 
or property interest, as a matter of case law. Adams specifically provides "the right to operate a 
motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right or 
liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the Federal and State 
Constitutions". See Adams v. City ofPocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 101,416 P.2d 46,48 (1966). 
The guarantees under the constitution are often characterized as "property rights", 
"liberty interests", or "property interests" and "liberty rights", depending on the context of the 
discussion, whose saying it, and in what context. At the very least, a driver's license, under 
Idaho law, is not a "mere privilege", and is a "protected" and "guaranteed" "right" under Federal 
and State Constitutions. Can you simply ineinge upon a protected and guaranteed right, 
preserved in the Constitution with an administrative ruling that suspends it upon an Agency 
basis, and if you can, are you allowed to do so lowing 
substantive due process of law, inherent in the enforcement of all court orders? 
Where is the statutory procedural or substantive "due process" in this administrative 
process that allows the Agency to take a right as defined, when in the statute it says you cannot 
take that which constitutes a property interest; where is that needed substantive due process in 
this statute when it does not define the basis upon what constitutes cause to take or not to take 
the right or interest? 
We understand FLLSA came into being, and by now recognized by all, as an attempt to 
secure the right to receive the Federal grants to provide welfare for families under the Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families Program (TANF). Idaho was faced with the need to demonstrate 
some level of compliance with 42 U.S.C. 8 666(a)(16). It created this enactment as a way to 
retain a right to receive grants, but should it be allowed to disregard substantive due process, 
override the Adams case, and sidestep judicial proceedings with non-legislative administrative 
rulings and definitions that ignore the contempt powers of the court and eliminate the critical 
review of the elements of willfkdness required in traditional analysis for the enforcement of court 
orders? 
i The Department wants to preserve the use of this legislation, apparently to preserve its 
right to receive grants, but has it proven over time to be even remotely related to the purpose that 
I 
I was objectively being sought to be achieved to get more child support from fathers when you add 
to unemployment and take the enforcement of court orders out of the court from where they were 
rulings. 
The legislation is flawed; its enforcement has left us with a poor choice of available 
venues, and the good cause used has resulted in a situation that contradicts case authority and 
I required elements of due process, and is being enforced in a way that preempts the rational 
I enforcement of judicial orders with the proper oversight of judicial proceedings. 
This Appellant's license must be reinstated, and should FLLSA not be ruled 
unconstitutional and unenforceable as written, with respect to a driver's license, and if construed 
to be enforceable in any fashion, we do urge this Court to find it must be enforced only in a 
judicial setting, and allow for judicial proceedings, and Appellant would then request the matter 
be remanded in such a manner as to allow Appellant the alternative avenue of proceeding in a 
judicial proceeding, to address his fin 
compliance with the l awl l  enforcement of 
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